Looking for a Way Around the Territorial Dispute : Japan: Soviet control of the southern Kuril islands has kept Tokyo and Moscow far apart since 1945. But there are signs of warming that skirt the issue.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama have described their three-day meeting in Tokyo this week as a potential “turning point” and a “beginning in earnest.”

Their agenda is to prepare for Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s state visit to Japan next April. Japan’s first priority is still the “northern territories”--the handful of small islands at the southern end of the Kuril chain--claimed by Japan but occupied by the Soviets since 1945. This is virtually the only territory still disputed by World War II combatants.

Tokyo’s official position remains that the islands, within sight of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, must be returned to Japanese sovereignty before there can be any real improvement in relations, or a bilateral peace treaty formally concluding World War II. But some key leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have recently signaled greater flexibility.

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu acknowledged this summer that it would be “too stubborn” for Japan to refuse any significant increase in ties before settling the territorial issue. He offered a variety of exchange programs and, particularly welcome in Moscow, increased Japanese help with the Chernobyl nuclear cleanup. Hard-liners in the finance and foreign ministries continue, however, to resist credits for the Soviets until settlement of the territorial dispute is in sight.

Japan may underestimate the intensity of Soviet, or at least Russian, nationalism on such territorial issues. Nikita Khrushchev or Leonid Brezhnev would have had the unilateral power to give up the islands, but no agreement yielding Soviet territory to Japan will easily pass either the national or Russian republic legislatures of today. A Soviet poll earlier this year allegedly showed 85% opposition to surrendering the islands.

Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin proposed late last month putting off a resolution for 15 to 20 years. Then, after joint Japanese-Soviet development of the islands and their eventual demilitarization, a “new generation” of Soviet and Japanese leaders could deal with ultimate sovereignty. This is totally unacceptable in Japan. But there may be a basis for discussion in other Soviet variations that include shorter time periods and options such as U.N. trusteeship, U.S. mediation and major Japanese economic and financial assistance to the Soviet Union.

Moscow knows it must reach an understanding with Asia’s most influential state if it wants to play a role in the Asian Pacific over the long run. Japan realizes it has to deal with Moscow if it wants political and military security in northeast Asia.

It is striking that both countries for the first time will discuss military and security issues, including confidence-building measures and arms control. Official Japanese suspicion of Soviet military objectives remains high, but parallel Japanese and Soviet policies on Cambodia and the Persian Gulf crisis, as well as signs of thinning Soviet forces in the disputed islands (and assurances that there are no nuclear weapons there) make discussions easier.

Japan does not want its security policies to get ahead of Washington’s, but it is beginning to reassess its own positions and interests. Lower tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union could diminish Japanese political support for U.S. bases (and for Japan’s payment of 40% of the cost of the bases), reduce consensus on Japan’s $30-billion defense budget, and even undermine the rationale for the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Most Japanese politicians, other than the Socialists, seem convinced that all of this can be managed.

Moscow insists, in the words of a Soviet deputy foreign minister, that improved Soviet-Japanese relations will “in no way damage the existing security framework between Japan and the United States.” This is an important message and as close as the Soviets are likely to come to saying that the arrangement contributes to stabilizing Japan’s role in Asia.

The U.S. position is clear. It will not interfere in the Japanese-Soviet negotiating process. Easing of Soviet-Japanese tensions should facilitate further reduction of Soviet forces in the region and ultimately contribute to similar easing on the Korean peninsula. And the importance of U.S.-Japanese relations goes far beyond mutual concern about the “Soviet threat.” The U.S.-Japan treaty provides for consultation, cooperation and collaboration on political, economic and security issues and will continue to be as vital for both sides after Soviet-Japanese detente as before.