Time to Define U.N.’s True Purpose

WASHINGTON — Ambassadors and international civil servants were ecstatic over the choice of Kofi Annan of Ghana as the U.N.’s seventh secretary-general. U.S. officials were among the loudest applauders. In her speech of congratulations, Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, the newly nominated secretary of state, hailed Annan for doing “difficult jobs well, with fairness, sound judgment, humor and no shrinking from accountability.” But, despite all the praise, the United States has hung an albatross around the new secretary-general’s neck.

Since the Clinton administration pilloried outgoing Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as a failure on reform, Congress will expect his successor to come through with concrete changes that trim and revitalize the U.N. system. But reform is a phony issue.

The United States vetoed the bid of Boutros-Ghali for a second term not over reform, but because they regarded him as too independent and arrogant, and clashed with him repeatedly over Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and other issues. The secretary-general liked to mull over problems in private, keep his decisions to himself and then recommend actions to the Security Council without consulting the United States first. Albright and other Americans sometimes found it exasperating to deal with him.

But rather than revive old and controversial issues like Somalia and Bosnia, the Clinton administration cited reform as its rationale for the veto--a safe issue on which everyone in Washington, whether in the Democratic White House or the Republican Congress, seemed to agree.

It is true that Boutros-Ghali never showed much zeal in carrying out reform. He had too many other problems of international import to fret about. But, whether zealous or not, he had an illustrious American accountant, Joseph E. Connor, handpicked by the Clinton administration, at his side as undersecretary, and Boutros-Ghali put into effect what Connor recommended--staff reductions, budget clampdowns, limits on the enormous flow of paper, computerization, an effective inspector general’s office. Most of what is left is not the real responsibility of a secretary-general.

The State Department has told the U.N. it wants consolidation of the 15 agencies dealing with economic development, and most of their work put into the hands of the U.N. Development Program. Under the plan, some agencies like the U.N. Development Fund for Women, the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, Habitat and the International Fund for Agricultural Development would be abolished.

But that kind of consolidation is out of the hands of the secretary-general. It has to be approved by the member states of the U.N.--especially the 54 on the Economic and Social Council, which oversee U.N. programs in economic development.

Moreover, the incessant American calls for reform while the U.S. owes more than $1 billion in back dues has irritated both our European allies and suspicious Third World governments, stiffening the resistance to basic reform.

To complicate matters even more, most of the worst anecdotes about inefficiency and corruption come out of independent U.N. agencies, like the World Health Organization in Geneva, that have their own budgets and governing bodies. They are completely out of the reach of a secretary-general. Only determined governments can keep the WHO and its brothers in line.

The 58-year-old Annan knows all this, but he also knows it is vital for the U.N. to shore up its relationship with Congress. A soft-spoken conciliator with a good sense of humor and an air of sincerity and frankness, he is sure to spend a good deal of his time exhorting his small army of civil servants to reform; preaching good governance to agencies beyond his reach, and using his considerable charm to persuade Congress that he and the U.N. are on a cost-effective track. He is likely to demonstrate his resolve by creating a new post of deputy undersecretary-general for administration and management.

Annan may succeed in persuading Congress. He is so well-liked in U.N. circles that he has an uncanny knack for escaping any stain when mud-slinging is underway. He was elevated to undersecretary general in charge of peacekeeping in March 1993, only because his predecessor, Marrack Goulding, did not want the U.N. to become involved in peace enforcement in Somalia. U.S. officials pressured Boutros-Ghali into replacing Goulding with someone more “flexible.”

In the end, Goulding was proven correct. The so-called “robust” U.N. mission to Somalia collapsed and turned into a debacle in October 1993, when 18 U.S. Rangers died in a single raid. But the Clinton administration, looking for a scapegoat, ignored Annan. Instead, U.S. officials tried to saddle Boutros-Ghali with the blame.

In a similar way, Annan escaped all the American scorn heaped on Boutros-Ghali and his representative, Yasushi Akashi, for the supposed failures of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. U.S. officials castigated Boutros-Ghali and Akashi for standing in the way of bombing the Serbs--even though the French commanding general, who reported to Annan, invariably agreed with the decisions of Akashi. Both publicly and privately, Annan defended his peacekeepers against U.S. criticism that they were too passive, but, in the end, the Americans did not blame him for anything.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has already invited Annan to meet with committee members. Though Annan is expected to come to Washington soon, he is not likely to act like a toady. In his own quiet way as undersecretary, he developed a reputation for frankness that sometimes made him seem as independent as Boutros-Ghali.

He infuriated his fellow Africans, for example, when he told a French newspaper that he had trouble recruiting African soldiers as peacekeepers because African governments “probably need their armies to intimidate their own populations.”

Nor did he hide his displeasure in 1993 when President Bill Clinton decided to withdraw U.S. troops from the peacekeeping force in Somalia. Annan predicted correctly that, despite Clinton’s plea that others take the place of the Americans, all would follow their lead and withdraw as well.

But independent words from Annan are always spoken softly--without any air of combativeness. “The only drawback of Kofi that I can think of,” said a long-time top official of the U.N., “is that he may be too nice. But maybe that’s a good thing.”

In accepting the post of secretary-general, Annan told the General Assembly, speaking in both French and English, “With the passing of the Cold War, the member states, as they redefine their relationships with each other, must agree on what kind of United Nations they are prepared to support.

“The time to choose is now. For this organization, along with the rest of the world, must change . . . .

“There is no lack of blueprints for a new, post-Cold War United Nations,” he went on. “There is no lack of ideas or debate. What we need is consensus and commitment. Our task now is to find common ground, to shape together the changes that will move the organization forward.”

The will of the members, not reform, is the crucial issue of the U.N. today. The U.N. was so badly burned in Somalia and Bosnia that it is now hesitant to take on new crises. But if the U.N. does not take on the impending crises in such disaster areas as Burundi and Zaire, who is going to do it? If the U.N. can no longer deal with these horrors, what is its purpose?

As Annan made clear in his acceptance speech, these are the central questions that will determine the U.N.’s future. To placate U.S. politics, however, Annan will have to spend much of his time showing Washington that, unlike his predecessor, he is just wild about reform.